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DEATH BY TREATY:
SOUTH AFRICA'S MEDICINES AND RELATED SUBSTANCES
AMENDMENT ACT OF

1997 AND THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE

RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
By: Matthew Leis
1.

INTRODUCTION

For some nations, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
become the top predator; one which feeds on human prey. The HIV/AIDS
epidemic has exploded across much of Africa and the danger is escalating
quickly. South Africa alone is believed to have one in five adults infected with
the HIV virus.' It is also estimated that over 91,000 babies were infected with
HIV during 2002 alone.2 These babies were infected via mother to child
transmission which is almost completely preventable with the administration of
the proper medication. 3 This epidemic is mirrored throughout most of the
world, but is especially prevalent in third world countries where the population
is poor and often uneducated. A short list of other countries where HIV is
particularly rampant include Brazil, India, Thailand, and many of the other
nations in Sub-Sahara Africa.
Unfortunately, medicine to combat the HIV virus is very expensive.
Often the patented or "designer" versions of these drugs can cost an individual
around $15,000 to $20,000 per annual treatment in the United States;
comparatively, the per capita income in South Africa is only $6,800. 4 Another
problem in medicating the infected public is that most countries lack the
infrastructure and technology to produce medicines internally.
Thus, many developing or less developed countries are faced with an
HIV epidemic without the economic or industrial means to combat this growing
*Mr. Leis is a student at Hofstra University School of Law. He would like to thank Professor Julian
Ku for his guidance and direction with this note. He dedicates this note to his parents, Thomas and
Jerilyn Leis, for their love, encouragement and support.
1 Marilynn Marchione, AIDS ContinuesSpreading; 20% ofAdults in South Africa Have Virus, U.N.
says (2003), at http://www.jsonline.com/alive/news/nov03/188110.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
(It is important to note that the 20% infection rate is only an estimate because many of the people
infected with the HIV virus do not report their illness.).
2 Avert.org, South Africa HIV/AIDS Statistics,at http://www.avert.org/safricastats.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2004).

3Avert.org, supranote 2. (The problem here is two fold. First, the drugs which would prevent
mother to child transmission cost too much for the poor to afford. Second, many of the mothers are
uneducated, and either do not get tested for the HIV virus, or are unaware of the preventive measures
available; that is, if they can afford them.).
4 Duncan Reekie, South Africa's Battle With AIDS andDrugPrices(2000), at
http://www.ncpa.org/ba/ba334/ba334.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). (Although drug prices are
much lower in South African, most of the population still cannot afford them. For example, two
medications commonly taken by AIDS patients are AZT and Didanosine. A United States customer
will pay approximately $10.12 for AZT and $7.25 for Didanosine, whereas a South African
customer will pay approximately $2.16 and $2.80 respectively.).
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problem. 5 This shortage, or in the cases where the drugs are available, the simple
inability of the population to afford the medication, leads people to cry for
immediate relief.
Some governments have responded to this pressure by importing much
cheaper generic versions of the expensive patented HIV medicines which can
cost approximately $350 per annual treatment.6 At a meeting in 2001, all of the
World Trade Organization members agreed (including the United States) that
public health concerns should override certain patent rights. 7 However, the
implementation of this decision has proven to be much more difficult than
previously thought.
In an attempt to combat the suffering of people with HIV, the
government of South Africa enacted the Medicines and Related Substances Act
of 1997 and subsequent Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act of
2003, in order to grant the South African Minister of Health the power to
"prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain
circumstances so as to protect the health of the public." 8 This Act provoked a
strong response from the world's pharmaceutical industry, causing thirty nine
pharmaceutical manufacturers to bring suit against South Africa in 1998.9 The
plaintiffs claimed that South Africa violated the Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement when the country changed its law (adopting
the Medicines Amendment Act of 1997).'o

5See Trade and Development in the World Trade Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devel-e/devel-e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). (This link will
explain the designations: "developed, developing, and least developed" which are coined by the
WTO and will be used throughout this note. A nation has the power to decide for themselves what
status their country has achieved. The majority of WTO members consider themselves developing
countries.).
6PressureAgainst AIDS Drug CompaniesBlackmailingAfrica (2001), at
http://www.afrol.com/Categories/Health/health051 aidsdrug_price.htm(last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
7 Kathlyn Card-Beckles, U.S. Removes Roadblock in WTO Drug Talks, The Intellectual Property
Strategist, Aug. 12, 2003.
8 South African Medicines Amendment Act of 1997, § 15(C), available at
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/legislation/acts/1 997/act90.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). See also
Patrick Marc, Compulsory Licensing and the South African Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or
Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of intellectual PropertyRights Agreement?, New York Law
School, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 117 (2001). (The South African Medicines and
Related Substances Amendment Act of 1997 was later replaced by the South African Medicines and
Medical Devices Regulatory Act. However, SAMMDRA did not repeal § 15 and §22 of the 1997
Act.).
9 Liz Highleyman, AIDS Drug Patents and Pricing Remain at Issue, Bay Area Reporter (2001), at
http://www.aegis.com/news/bar/2001/BR010406.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). (This suit was
eventually dropped and a settlement was reached due in no small part to the negative public image
the pharmaceutical companies were developing.).
1oTim Westmoreland, Interview with Timothy Westmoreland,Professorof Law and Public Policy,
Georgetown University, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REv. 64 (2003). (Specifically, plaintiffs argued a
multitude of violations, but this article focuses on §15(C) of the 1997 Act.) See also Notice of
Motion in pharmaceutical case, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2004). (This website lists the plaintiffs in the pharmaceutical case. Also, the
original complaint had forty two plaintiffs as listed on this website)
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The pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that they are in a tough
predicament. If they donate or severely discount the cost of HIV medication
exported to countries in need, they would lose profits which are then invested
back into their research and development departments. Typically, it costs
approximately $500 million to develop a new drug, and most drugs do not see a
return of this initial expense. 1' The pharmaceutical industry argues that it is
unfair and illegal to force them to lose profits from these patented inventions
because the major underlying policy of patent systems is to give the inventor a
monopoly for a limited time as a quid pro quo for both public disclosure and the
initial cost of developing the invention.' 2 If manufacturers are subsequently
3
denied profit, they will be unwilling and unable to make the initial investment.
All developed countries, and most developing or least developed
countries have intellectual property (IP) law already in place to govern their
domestic affairs. 14 However, as the number of nations engaged in world trade
through the WTO increases, 5 the complexities of combining the various legal
systems creates conflict. Also, this complexity escalates exponentially when the
human struggle against disease is added to the mix. Thus, modem IP law is
being shaped by the clash of individual member nations' legal systems with
pressure added from certain populations suffering from epidemics.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GENERAL HISTORY AND
BACKGROUND
Patent laws function to advance technology under the theory that
granting patentees the right to exclude others from practicing the patented
invention for a limited time benefits society as a whole. In fact, this right is one

11Arnoldo Lacayo,

Comment: Seeking a Balance: InternationalPharmaceuticalPatentProtection,

Public Health Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism,33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
295, 301 (2002).
12See, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). See also, Kara
Bombach, Can South Africa FightAids? Reconciling the South African Medicines and Related
SubstancesAct with the TRIPs Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273,281 (2001) (Most
pharmaceuticals only have significant marketability for approximately 10 years because of the
invention and release of better drugs (having less side effects) usually occurs at around this time.
Thus, for about half of the patent life (term of 20 years) the patent acts only as a deterrent rather than
a reward for efforts.).
13Kara Bombach, Can South Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling the South African Medicinesand
Related SubstancesAct with the TRIPs Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 281 (The United States
government actually subsidizes much of the AIDS research so that pharmaceutical companies incur
a small percentage of the actual initial costs. It can be argued that the pharmaceutical industry looses
very little from discounting prices or the implementation of some other price reduction mechanisms
because the poor populations would not be able to afford these medicines anyway.).
14See Trade and Development in the World Trade Organization, supra note 5.
"sSee Structure of the World Trade Organization, at
http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto_e/whatise/inbriefe/inbr02_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
(The WTO has nearly 150 members, accounting for over 97% of world trade. Around 30 others are
negotiating membership.).
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16
of the few specifically enumerated rights in the United States Constitution.
The temporary monopoly granted to an inventor serves many overlapping
purposes.
First, patent rights allow a patentee to disclose his invention to the
public while retaining exclusive right to practice that invention.17 This allows
the public to learn from the invention and improve upon it. Public disclosure in
conjunction with a temporary monopoly advances science - and in turn society
- by stopping others from practicing the patented invention, thereby forcing
them to go out and make a "better mouse trap" if they wish to go into the
"mouse trap" business. The patent system thereby promotes scientific progress
by requiring creative advancement to enter certain markets.
Second, patent rights give an inventor economic incentive to invest
time and money into a project.' 8 The inventor is more willing to go through
great expense if he knows his efforts will be rewarded upon completion. 19 The
temporary monopoly makes it possible for companies to expend large amounts
of money in research and development.2 ° Companies would be extremely
reluctant to develop new products if their initial expense for doing so was not
recoupable.
Critics of the pharmaceutical industry acknowledge the above
arguments, but deny their impact on the industry's profit margin. For example,
African markets collectively comprise only 2% of the global market for
pharmaceuticals. 2' In fact, taken together, all developing nations comprise only
10% of the global market for pharmaceuticals. 22 Furthermore, most
pharmaceuticals are only profitable for approximately ten years, as contrasted
with the twenty year monopoly granted by most patent systems.23 This means
that for half of the patent's life it acts as a deterrent rather than a reward for time
and money invested. Upon the foregoing it can be argued that the second ten
year period for pharmaceutical patents acts only to prevent generic, low cost
equivalents depriving those in need of affordable medicine.24

16U.S. CONST. ART. I, §8, CL. 8. (The actual clause of the Constitution reads: "To promote the

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries... ").
"7Charles McManis, Patent Law and Policy Symposium: Re-EngineeringPatent Law: The
Challenge ofNew Technologies. 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2000).
'8 1d.
9

' 1d.

2 Id.
21 Bombach, supranote 13, at 302.
22 id

23 Bombach, supranote 13, at 283.
24id.
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III. EXAMINATION OF TRIPS AGREEMENT AND WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
The Uruguay Round was by all accounts the largest trade negotiation
ever.25 It took twice the original schedule (seven and a half years total) to come
to agreements on almost all aspects of international trade.26 For the purposes of
this Note, the two most important agreements made at the Uruguay Round were
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). With the
creation of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
replaced as the head international trade organization, although, much of
27 the
1947 GATT provisions still exist and provide a framework for global trade.
The TRIPs agreement attempts to create uniform international
intellectual property rights linked inextricably with international trade.28 To
achieve this difficult goal, the agreement sets out three main principles: (1) a
minimum standard of protection provided by each WTO member nation for
patents, copyrights, and trademarks; (2) procedures for domestic enforcement of
intellectual property rights; and (3) dispute settlement procedures. 29 TRIPs
differs from previous attempts at agreements regulating international intellectual
property and trade by requiring member nations to provide domestic procedures
and remedies to help enforce the rights of patentees.30
a.

Extent of Patent Rights Under TRIPs

The TRIPs agreement is one of about twenty five legal agreements
establishing the WTO, and the only one which covers IP rights specifically.31
The Agreement establishes an international minimum standard for intellectual
property protection, and as such, grants individual member nations great control
over their domestic laws. However, deference is afforded so long as the laws are
in compliance with TRIPs. 32 The minimal standard of protection for patents
under TRIPs was not arrived at easily as a huge gap exists between the
intellectual property goals of developed and least developed / developing

2' See Understanding the World Trade Organization, Uruguay Round Agreements, at

http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). (This
link provides general information about the Uruguay Round Agreements.).
26id.
27id.

28Christopher K. Eppich, PatentingDilemma: Drugsfor Profit Verses Drugsfor Health, 43 SANTA

CLARA L. REv. 289, 293 (2002).
29id.
30Peng Jiang, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13
ALB. L.J. Sci. AND TECH. 223, 225 (2002).
31World Trade Organization, supranote 25.
32
GEORGE R. STEWART, MYRA J. TAWFIK AND MAUREEN IRISH, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 100 (WESTVIEW PRESS 1994).
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nations. 33 Moreover, the TRIPs agreement was more than the result of
negotiations debating the economic needs of the member nations, it also
represented a balance between the humanitarian needs of the developing and
least developed countries and the legal rights of the developed countries (most
major patent holders reside in developed countries).34
The least developed and developing countries did not want strong
patent protection as it drastically increases the cost of importing patented
products for sale in their countries.35 Before TRIPs, many of the least
developing or developed countries refused to grant patent rights to several types
of products.36
Brazil, for example, refused to grant patent rights to
pharmaceuticals prior to 1996 even though they are the fourth largest market for
pharmaceuticals in the world. 7 In fact, the United States refused to recognize
many types of patents when it was a young emerging nation. The motivation
for less IP protection is simple economics for developing nations: denying
patent protection increases competition thereby reducing price.

3 Id at 166.
34 Id.

3 Idat 167. (Loose patent protection laws have positive short term effects for least developed
or

developing nations as not only does it cost significantly more to import patented versions of drugs
than their generic counterparts, but the companies who produce the medicines do not reside in their
borders (no short term net economic loss). However, loose patent laws have been proven to injure
the economies of these countries in the long term. IP rights in developing countries must be strong
otherwise, the benefits of technology and exploitation of technological advancement will not be
available in the developing economies; instead it would simply flow back to the foreign patent
holder. Strong patent protection combined with the generally cheap labor in poorer countries,
encourage companies to invest in manufacturing technology which eventually lead to research and
development of new domestic patents. Strong patent protection also promotes foreign investment by
affording foreign patentees an opportunity to issue licenses to manufacture or distribute the patented
product domestically. These licenses are made with domestic companies, who are able to enjoy
some of the profits from the patent, thereby strengthening the economy.).
36Peng Jiang, Fighting the AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13
ALB. L.J. Sci. AND TECH. 223, 225 (2002). (At the beginning of the Uruguay Round table Trade
Negotiations, more than fifty nations did not offer patent protection on pharmaceuticals.).
37Rosalyn S. Park, The InternationalDrug Industry: What the Future Holdsfor South Africa's
HIV/AIDS Patients,11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 139 (2002).

226

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol3/iss1/12

6

Leis: Death By Treaty: South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

i.

Source of Patent Rights: Article 28 of TRIPs

Article 28 enumerates an inventors patent rights under TRIPs. 38 This
article mandates that the patent owner has the right "to prevent unauthorized
persons from using the patented process and [from] making, using, offering for
sale, or importing the patented product or a product obtained directly by the
patented process. 39 The right of a patent holder to exclude others from
practicing his invention is one of the most basic of all rights afforded to
inventors. 40 Often referred to as a negative right, the exclusion of others grants
the patent owner a monopoly as an incentive to make the initial investment in
development and as a reward for creativity which ultimately benefits the public.
However, the minimal standard of protection afforded under Article 28 leaves
member nations with great flexibility with regard to their domestic intellectual
property laws.
Exceptions to Patent Rights Under TRIPs

b.

Even though the TRIPs agreement creates a minimum standard for
intellectual property rights, the drafters created several "exceptions" member
nations may rely upon in certain circumstances. The Agreement contains
provisions allowing for compulsory licensing under Article 31, exclusion of
patent protection under Article 27, parallel importing under Article 6, and
adopting measures necessary to promote the public health under Article 8.41
i.

Patentable Subject Matter: Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement

Article 27(2) of TRIPs permits the government of a member nation to
"exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect "ordre public" or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
38Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, art. 28
states:

1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having
the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having
the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained
directly by that process.
2. Patent owner shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent
and to conclude licensing contracts.
'9Id. art. 28(1)(b).
40ALAN S. GUTTERMAN AND BENTLEY J. ANDERSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL

MARKETS (KLUWER LAW 1997). (A survey of the intellectual property laws of most countries as well
as the TRIPs agreement show that the negative right granted to patentees is common throughout.).
41Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 8, 27(2),
& 31.
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serious prejudice to the environment. 42 In other words, a member nation may
deny patentability to a single or class of inventions if that government
determines the invention's introduction into the domestic market would have
one of the aforementioned ill effects. However, Article 27(2) does not act as a
"free for all" provision. Instead,43it sets a high threshold before it is applicable
and then, only for a limited time.
A disturbance of "ordre public" is much more than mere public order or
public interest. The concept of "ordre public" stems from security concerns,
such as riots, wide spread public disorder, or inventions which might lead to
criminal or other behavior the government finds generally unacceptable. 44 The
"ordre public" provision is quite broad, and includes "protecting human, animal
or plant life or health. 45 Unfortunately, the agreement is silent about what
in Article 27(2), leaving
constitutes a danger to any of the categories enumerated
46
this decision up to the individual member nations.
The concept of morality with respect to patentability is equally vague.
Morality differs drastically from generation to generation and is almost entirely
subject to the whim of the values prevailing in society at that point. TRIPs
leaves the definition of morality up to the individual governments of the member
nations because, it is believed, they are best able to determine what constitutes
morality for themselves.
Before Article 27(2) is invoked by a member nation, two restrictions
must first be met. First, patent rights may only be denied if the commercial
exploitation of the invention would injure the interests enumerated in Article
27(2); requiring more than a mere determination of danger from a patented
product.47 It follows logically that if a product is too dangerous to be afforded
patent protection under Article 27(2) - a threat to "ordre public" - it is too
dangerous to be imported. Thus, accompanying legislation is almost always
required when Article 27(2) is invoked and this exception rarely serves to
sidestep legal rights in favor of cheaper products.48

42Id.art. 27(2).
43Peng Jiang, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. AND TECH. 223, 230 (2002). (A member nation which excludes a product from patent

protection can only do so for as long as the emergency situation continues. After that, protection
must be restored.)
4CARLOs M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 190 (Kluwer Law 1998).
45Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27(2).
46Peng Jiang, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. AND TECH. 223, 229 (2002). (In fact, there is currently a debate over the exact breadth
of this provision. Least developed countries argue that the provision allows a country to loosen
patent protection for certain medicines because this protects the "ordre public." The other side
claims that the plain meaning of the provision must be understood to explain that the patentability of
harmful inventions is not protected; which is wholly separate to the patentability of merely
expensive ones.).
47Id.
4Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The
TRIPs Agreement 193 (Kluwer Law 1998).
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Second, under Article 27(2), exclusion from patentability is not allowed
if the reasoning is merely because of a conflict with existing domestic law. In
other words, the basis behind the exclusion must come from the Article itself,
not from domestic law. 49
ii.

Principles: Article 8 of the TRIPs Agreement

Article 8 of the TRIPs agreement is also built on the theory that in
certain circumstances, the public good must outweigh the inventors rights. °
Almost as soon as it was enacted, Article 8 was used by member nations as a
major road around the patented protection of certain products. 51 This article
allows members to formulate, amend or "adopt measures necessary to protect
public heath and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided
52
that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
Article 8 of TRIPs reflects the sovereign power of nations to protect the
welfare of their citizens. This article, simply put, allows member nations to
enact legislation beyond the extent of TRIPs. The only requirement a
government must meet is that the measures or legislation adopted is "necessary
to protect public health. 53 As is consistent within TRIPs, determinations like
morality, dangers to "ordre public" and necessity are left in the hands of the
individual member nations.
Several countries have used Article 8's regulatory exception to legalize
parallel imports, compulsory licenses, and generic drugs in an attempt to ease
the suffering of a public health crisis.54 Domestic legislation enacted under
Article 8 was recently upheld by the WTO dispute resolution body which held

49Id.

soAmoldo Lacayo, Comment: Seeking a Balance: InternationalPharmaceuticalPatent Protection,
Public Health Crises,and the Emerging Threatof Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
295, 302 (2002).
51See generally, Rachel Swarns, AIDS Drug Battle Deepens in Africa, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2001, at
Al.
52Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 8 states:
(1) "Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
(2) Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology."
53Id.(Emphasis added).
54Amoldo Lacayo, Comment: Seeking a Balance: InternationalPharmaceuticalPatentProtection,
Public Health Crises,and the Emerging Threatof Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv.
295, 305 (2002).
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that Canadian law legalizing compulsory 5licensing, parallel importing and
generic drugs was in conformity with TRIPs.
iii. Compulsory Licenses: Article 31 of TRIPs Agreement
Compulsory licenses are a feature of non-American patent law which
allows for involuntary licensing of patented products. 56 Compulsory licenses

work as follows: Company A wants a license from company B to produce a
certain patented product. However, because company B wishes this product only
to be marketed under their trademark (or for other reasons), they refuse
company A's offer. Company A may now obtain a compulsory license
regardless of company B's express desire not to issue one. The license cost is
calculated differently depending upon the laws of the nation in which the
companies reside. Most governments have traditionally been compulsory license
friendly because they greatly increase competition and thereby reduce costs.
Compulsory licenses have been shown to reduce the cost of certain
pharmaceuticals by as much as ninety-five percent.5 7 Article 31 of TRIPs
use without authorization of the right holder" - a.k.a.
encompasses "other 58
compulsory licensing.
Compulsory licensing is permitted under Article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement "where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by
government or third parties authorized by the government., 59 TRIPs, however,
55WTO Panel Decision WT/DS 114/R, availableat

http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/distabase-wto-membersl_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2004). (Decision made March 17th, 2000. Choose the link for Canada as respondent and search for
WT/DSI 14/R)
56WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIAL ON PATENT LAW 772 (5th
ed. 2002) (1972). (American patent law does not recognize compulsory licenses, except in a global
context govemed by TRIPs. Legal scholars in the United States consider compulsory licenses to be
contrary to one's freedom to contract as well as the basic right of exclusion granted to patentees.).
57Rosalyn S. Park, The InternationalDrug Industry: What the Future Holdsfor South Africa's
HIVAIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 129 (2002).
58Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31(a) and
(b), state:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of apatent without
the authorization of the right holder, including use by government or third parties
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of pubic non-commercial use. In
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of
public non-commercial use, where the government has demonstrable grounds to know
that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be
informed promptly;
Said
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does not allow a government to grant compulsory licenses in all cases. Article
31 subjects the government of the member nation to several conditions before a
compulsory license may be granted. The first, and most basic condition6 is that
only the government of a member nation may grant compulsory licenses. 0
Article 31(b) provides that compulsory licenses are proper only when
[1] "the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the patent
holder on reasonable commercial terms" and [2] "that such efforts have been
unsuccessful within a reasonable period of time.'
However, the good faith
effort requirements of Article 31(b) can be waived in a time of "national
emergency, in circumstances of extreme urgency, or in cases of public noncommercial use. 62 In other words, Article 31 (b) of TRIPs forces governments
to negotiate in good faith for a reasonable period of time, but leaves open a
loophole to be used only when some catastrophe has made time extremely
scarce.
Another controversial aspect of Article 31 is subsection (f) which
requires the compulsory license to be "authorized predominately for the supply
of the domestic market of the Member state authorizing such use. 63 It is not
entirely clear whether Article 31(f) requires countries to manufacture the
product domestically, or whether they may have a foreign third party
manufacture the product to be imported. The opponents of the latter
interpretation argue that the third party is not privy to the circumstances giving
rise to the compulsory license and, therefore, should not be allowed to
manufacture the patented product. As of 2004, this dilemma has not been
resolved.
Although Article 31 clearly grants a member nation the right to grant
compulsory licenses at times of "national emergency or extreme urgency," the
Agreement itself gives no standards by which to define these terms. 64 Another
problem is that Article 3 1(h) provides: the "right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration" for the license. 5 Again, the Agreement provides no standards by
which to define "adequate remuneration." 66 Typically, in domestic affairs,
reasonable royalties have been calculated based on what the patentee has offered
similarly situated licensees in the past, but this is an imperfect rule as costs and

60Peng Jiang, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13

ALB. L.J. SC. AND TECH. 223, 229 (2002).
61 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31 (b).
62

id.

63

Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31 (f),

states:
(f)
any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market
of the Member authorizing such use;
64Peng Jiang, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China'sOptions Under The WTO TRIPs Agreement. 13
ALB. L.J. Sci. AND TECH. 223, 232 (2002).
65Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31 (h),
states:
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.
66Id.
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complications can increase the price dramatically when dealing with overseas
exports.67
iv. Parallel Importation: Article 6 of TRIPs Agreement
Parallel importation is another method used to reduce patented drug
prices. Parallel importation occurs when an original licensed purchaser buys the
patented product, then sells it to a third non-licensed party (without permission
from the patentee).6 8 This type of trade occurs because pharmaceutical
companies will tier their prices depending on the individual member nation. For
example, a particular drug will be sold to Country A for $X, and Country B for
less than $X. Under this method, Country A would sell their patented product to
Country B, instead of B buying directly from the pharmaceutical company. 69
Parallel importation stems from the patent law concept of exhaustion. 70 This
theory holds that once a patented product is sold (placed in the stream of
commerce) its subsequent resale is no longer determined by the patentee - in
other words, his rights to that product are exhausted. 7'
The TRIPs Agreement addressed this issue by refusing to take a
position.72 Article 6 of the TRIPs agreement states: "For the purposes of dispute
settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Article 3 and 4
nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of
intellectual property rights. 73 Thus, Article 6 of TRIPs manifests the drafters
intention to leave the issue of parallel importation up to the individual Member
States. Due to the position TRIPs adopts in Article 6, the question still remains
whether a patent holder's rights are exhausted globally once a product is sold
anywhere in the world.
Parallel importation acts as a double edged sword, however, because
while it can reduce the prices of pharmaceuticals for a single nation, it will at the
same time force the manufacturers to raise prices globally to counteract their lost
profits. This is a highly contested issue as parallel importation on a global scale
would allow an American to buy pharmaceuticals at the price offered in Brazil.
Although, for the American buyer, this seems ideal, it actually serves to defeat
the goals of TRIPs because this forces Member Nations to restrict trade to keep
prices up. Although parallel importation is a hotly contested issue, it is one with
which TRIPs can offer no assistance. The drafters choose to remain silent
regarding this issue, which now forces the member nations to determine this for
themselves.
67Patents and Protection of Patent Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2004).
68Kara Bombach, CanSouth Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Act with the TRIPs Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273,277 (2001).
69Id. (This note supplies a good example of parallel importing: Fluconazole (Diflucan) bought
directly from a patent holding company costs $4. 10 per dosage. This drug could be purchased
through parallel importation from Thailand for $0.60 per dosage.).
70 id.
71Id.

72Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, art. 31(h).
"sSee Id at art. 6.
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IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICINES AND RELATED
SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1997
As previously stated, South Africa is currently suffering from an
HIV/AIDS epidemic of almost biblical proportions. 74 Unfortunately, the
population of South Africa is very poor and cannot afford the proper
medication.75 In response to the public outcry, the Parliament of South Africa
enacted the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997
(SAMRSA), and its subsequent Medicines and Related Substances Amendment
Act of 2002,76 which empowered the Minister of Health to make broad decisions
concerning the intellectual property laws of the country.77 The SAMRSA was
drafted to help increase "the supply of more affordable medicines and to protect
the health of the public. 78
However, despite the Act's seemingly noble goals, it was met with
79
great resistance from the international community, mainly the United States.
The developed countries saw the SAMRSA as the beginning of the end for
pharmaceutical patent rights and argued that the Act violated the TRIPs
agreement. In particular, two provisions of SAMRSA were argued to be in
violation of TRIPs - §§ 15(c) and 22(c). These provisions are examined below.
a.

SAMRSA §15(C): Powers of the Minister of Health

Opponents of SAMRSA argue that §15(C) grants the South African
Minister of Health very broad powers relating to patent rights in South Africa.
The first provision, §15(C)(a), prescribes that the Minister of Health may
truncate the patent holder's rights of a medicine already placed into the South
African market, such that his rights do not extend to "acts" regarding the
patented medicine.80 This provision makes a distinction between the patent
holder's rights to the patented product and his rights to control that medicine
once entered into the South African marketplace. However, SAMRSA does not
provide a definition of "acts," nor does it elaborate on when the Minister of
Health may limit a patent holder's rights. 81
Section 15(C)(b) of SAMRSA is probably the most controversial
provision in the Act because it pertains to both compulsory licensing and the
importation of generic versions of patented medicines. In addition, the language
chosen to achieve this goal is arguably broad. Section 15(C)(b) grants the
" See Marchione, supranote 1.
75Id.
76 See generally South African Medicines Amendment Act of 1997, § 15(C), supra note 8.
77id.
78id.
79See Notice of Motion in pharmaceutical case, availableat
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharnasuit.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
80 South African Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act, §15(C)(a).
81See generally South African Medicines Amendment Act of 1997, supra note 8. (Note that the Act
contains no definition of"acts" and no further qualifications for when § 15(CXa) may be enforced.).
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Minister power to "prescribe the conditions for importation of a medicine which
is: [1] identical in composition; [2] meets the same quality standards; [3] has the
same name as that of another medicine already registered in South Africa; [but,
4] which is imported by someone other than the holder of the original
registration certificate; and [5] which originates from any site of manufacture. 82
It fails to address other qualifications for compulsory licenses outlined in Article
31 of TRIPs such as adequate compensation, or good faith negotiations.8 3
Section 15(C)(c) of SAMRSA gives the Minister power to determine
the registration procedure and subsequent domestic "use of" any medicine
referred to in §15(C)(b). 84 The fact that this section grants power to determine
registration procedures and requirements is not, in and of itself, challenged. The
controversial portion is the part of this section which allows the Minister to
prescribe the "use of' the medicines referred to in §15(C)(b).85 It is unclear from
the language of §15(C)(c) the extent of control over "use" the government
reserves.
b.

SAMRSA §22(C): Manufacture, Sale and Distribution

Section §22(C)(b) of SAMRSA, which was later amended by the South
African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 2002,86 grants the Council
power to issue a license to manufacture, sell, import, export or distribute
medicines or medical devices.8 7 This provision does not contain language
requiring a manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor to be domestic. 8 Nor does it
require that the products manufactured or sold under this section remain in
South Africa.8 9 In fact, §22(C)(b) does not address the location of these entities
82See generally South African Medicines Amendment Act of 1997, § 15(C)(b), supra note 8, states:
The minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may (b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in composition,
meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as that
of another medicine already registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a person
other than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine
already registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the original
manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be imported:
83 id.
84Id. §15(CXc), states:
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the medicine referred to
in paragraph (b).
5 id.
86See South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 2002, §22(C)(b), states:
(b) the council may, on application in the prescribed manner and on payment of the
prescribed fee issue to a manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor of a medicine or medical
device a license to manufacture, import or export, act as a wholesaler of or distribute, as
the case may be, such medicine or medical device, upon such conditions as to the
application of such acceptable quality assurance principles and good manufacturing and
distribution practices as the council may determine.
8 id.
88
id.
891d.
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at all. 90 Again, interpretation becomes an issue because it is not clear from the
Act whether a foreign manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor would suffice or
whether a domestic manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor would be allowed to
export out of country.
V.

SAMRSA: PROBLEMS OF VAGUENESS AND COMPLIANCE
WITH TRIPS

Complaints about SAMRSA can generally be broken down into two
categories: vagueness and compliance. The vagueness category includes
language from SAMRSA which does not clearly define legal rights and
obligations. The problem with a vague law is that it creates uncertainty for those
affected by it. For example, a foreign patent holder may withhold selling his
patented product in South Africa because he is unsure whether that product will
be granted protection. Alternatively, a patent owner could have already begun
selling his product assuming he has protection, only to have that protection later
retracted by the Minister of Health. The compliance category of complaints
regarding SAMRSA involves language from the act which may be in violation
of an article of the TRIPs agreement.
a.

Vagueness Concerns

Sections 15(C)(a) and (c) both contain vague language which may
result in the aforementioned legal uncertainty. Specifically, § 15(C)(a) states that
the Minister of Health may limit the "acts" regarding a patented medicine after
that medicine has been placed in the South African market. 9' The word "acts" is
left undefined and leaves the reader questioning both what actions are included
and the extent of control the Minister may assert.92
Section 15(C)(c) grants the Minister of Health power to determine the
"use of' a patented product in South Africa. 93 Again, the Act fails to define the
scope of the term "use of," which, conceivably could mean anything from how
the medicine is proscribed to distributed or sold. 94 Both §§ 15(C)(a) and (c) have
the possible result of severely limiting a patent holder's rights with regard to his
product. They also create concerns in developing nations because the extent of
this limiting effect is undefined.
However, the concerns over vagueness are secondary to that of
compliance. Compliance concerns are different because they raise questions on
whether sections of the SAMRSA could be in violation of an international
agreement; possibly rendering these sections illegal and unenforceable. These
concerns are paramount because non-compliance reduces the power of the

9

id.

91See supra note 8 at § 15(CXa).
92See supra note 8 at § 15(CXb). (Note that the word "acts" is left undefined.).
93See supra note 8 at § 15(CXc). (Note that the phrase "use of" is left undefined.).
94See generally supranote 8 at § 15(C).
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international agreement and creates precedent that the agreement is only a paper
tiger.
b. Compliance Concerns
Sections 15(C)(b) and 22(C)(b) are the focus of international concern
from developed countries. These sections grant the Minister of Health broad
powers concerning compulsory licenses and, the developed countries argue,
these broad powers fail to comport with the minimum standards set forth in the
TRIPs agreement. 9 The first concern is that §15(C)(b) fails to prescribe
conditions for granting a compulsory license such as compensation to the patent
holder and good faith negotiations. The problem here is that both compensation
are requirements for a compulsory license under TRIPs Article
and negotiations
96
31 (b).
The question then becomes whether the SAMRSA's absence of the
conditions established under TRIPs Article 31(b) is a violation of the minimum
standard of protection offered under TRIPs. It is the opinion of this author that
such absence is a violation of TRIPs. TRIPs was drafted to create a base or
ground level of protection for intellectual property - an agreed minimum arrived
at after extensive negotiations. A Member Nation is then free to establish any
laws which supplement the minimum standards established in TRIPs, but they
cannot choose to go below those minimums. For example, South Africa could
have required a judge to determine the adequate compensation for patent holders
in compulsory license cases. This would represent a standard greater than that
required by TRIPs Article 31. The SAMRSA, however, wrote into law
requirements that are lower than is written in Article 31 - thereby violating the
TRIPs agreement.
Another concern over §15(C)(b) is the principle of territoriality which
prevents one Member Nation from interfering with the rights of a patent owner
in another Member Nation. 97 It is argued that the principle of territoriality is
found in TRIPs under Article 31 (f) which precludes a Member Nation from
getting a compulsory license and then having the goods manufactured in another
country. 98 Article 31 (f) of TRIPs states that "any such use shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing
such use." 99 The language "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market" gives rise to the principle of territoriality.' °

9-See Notice of Motion in pharmaceutical case, supra note 79.
96Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31(b).
(See note 58 supra for the entire article.).
97Divya Murthy, The Futureof Compulsory Licensing: Decipheringthe Doha Declarationon the
TRIPs Agreement andPublicHealth, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1299, 1334 (2002).
98Id at 1334. (Member Nations with poor manufacturing capabilities cannot get compulsory licenses
if that country cannot manufacture the product domestically due to the principle of territoriality.).
99Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31 (f).
1oo
See Divya Murthy, supranote 97.
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Section 15(C)(b) of SAMRSA states that the South African
government may prescribe conditions for which a medicine meeting certain
standards and manufactured by one other than the patent holder "may be
imported."'' 1 The contested part of this section is not that it gives the South
African government the power to issue compulsory licenses; rather, it is that
§15(C)(b) gives the government the power to issue compulsory licenses to
foreign nations, which violates the principle of territoriality created under
Article 31(f) of TRIPs. 102 For example, South Africa could grant a domestic
company a compulsory license for medicines which would be manufactured out
of country. The problem with this manufacturing arrangement is that the
compulsory license would be for South Africa only - not the third party foreign
manufacturer, and now that third party would be receiving an unjust enrichment
because they also benefit from the lower prices brought by compulsory licenses.
Section 22(C)(b) of SAMRSA and its related Amendment Act in 2002,
present similar problems with territoriality. This section can be read to be in
violation of Article 31 of TRIPs under two different interpretations. First,
§22(C)(b) seems to allow for importation of foreign manufactured patented
products under a compulsory license granted to South Africa.10 3 Second,
§22(C)(b) allows for exportation of a product manufactured in South Africa
under a compulsory license granted to that country only.'0 4 Both of these
situations violate the principle of territoriality because they allow foreign third
parties to be included in a compulsory license, which by the terms of Article
31 (f), should only be granted for predominately domestic purposes.10 5
However, it is argued by certain legal scholars that territoriality is a
changing concept and may no longer be a bar when a developing or least
developed country lacks the capability to manufacture medicines
domestically. 0 6 This argument is based on changing world trade relations and
the immediacy of the AIDS epidemic. 10 7 Thus, it depends on whether the WTO
considers territoriality to be part of TRIPs or a fleeting concept no longer alive
in international trade law - a decision which has not been decisively resolved.
VI. IS THE SAMRSA REALLY NECESSARY? - SOLUTIONS
WITHIN TRIPS.
South Africa's goal to get affordable medication is not impossible,
regardless of the SAMRSA's debated compliance with TRIPs. The solution to
101
South African Medicines Amendment Act of 1997, §15(C)(b), supra note 8.
102 Id. See also Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,

art. 31(f).

103 See South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 2002, §22(CXb), supra note 86.
(Note the words "import or export" were added in the 2002 amendment of the Act.).

1°4id.
105
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3 I(f).

106 The principle of territoriality is argued to be breaking down due to the current trend towards
multi-national politics and markets. A good example of this is the European Patent Office. See supra
note 97.

id.

107
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their problem can be found within several articles of the TRIPs agreement itself;
most notably Article 31. TRIPs, again, represents only a minimum level of
protection for intellectual property. South Africa has plenty of legal
maneuvering room within this agreement such that it need look no further to
solve the countries patent woes.
Article 31(b)- National Emergency

a.

Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement grants all Member Nations the
power to issue compulsory licenses in certain circumstances.10 8 Under this
article, South Africa may act in one of three ways. First they may negotiate with
the pharmaceutical companies for authorization from the patent holder for a
license.' 0 9 Unfortunately, due to their complex nature, and the great amount of
money involved, these negotiations will probably carry very high transaction
costs. If these negotiations do not succeed within a reasonable amount of time,
then South Africa would be within its rights, under Article 31(b), to grant a
compulsory license for the patented product so long as they give "adequate"
compensation to the patent holder." 0
Alternatively, South Africa may bypass the negotiations entirely and
grant a compulsory license for medication under Article 31(b)'s provision for
situations of "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.""' The question here, is whether the AIDS epidemic currently facing
South Africa qualifies as a national emergency or a circumstance of extreme
urgency. As is usual within TRIPs, neither of these terms are defined within the
document, which gives the individual member nations the power to define
them. 1 2 Before South Africa chooses to invoke Article 31(b) of trips, several
questions must be answered: (1) Can the AIDS epidemic be viewed as a national
emergency; (2) what is required for South Africa to declare a national
emergency; (3) how long can a state of national emergency be upheld; and (4)
does a compulsory license granted under a state of emergency prohibit future
good faith negotiations?
i.

Is South Africa's AIDS Epidemic a National Emergency?

In November 2001, the Council for Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights met in Doha and agreed on how certain articles in
TRIPs should be interpreted." 3 The Doha Declaration confirmed that "each
108See supranote 72 at art. 31.
109See supranote 72 at art. 31(b).

"10Id. (Note the term "adequate" is not defined within TRIPs.) See supranote 65.
1

1id.

112Id.

113WTO

Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health,

WT/M1N(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha], also available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl tripse.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2004).
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WTO member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted, while respecting
the terms and conditions of Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement.!" 14 The Doha
Council also made clear that each Member Nation may determine for
themselves when to declare a national emergency for purposes of Article
31(b)."' Finally, the Declaration specifically recognized that the HIV/AIDS
epidemic "can represent a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency."' " 6 In light of the Doha Declaration, the South African government is
within their rights under TRIPs to declare the current HIV epidemic a national
emergency. It is now important to determine if any domestic law would preclude
South Africa from declaring a state of national emergency and begin
manufacturing medicines domestically to meet the needs of their people.
ii.

Declaring a National Emergency

South Africa, in light of the Doha Declaration, has complete control
over its national state of emergency for purposes of Article 31 (b). Unfortunately,
South Africa's domestic law pertaining to such a declaration is not as clear.
Section 34 of the South African Constitution holds: "A state of emergency shall
be proclaimed prospectively under an Act of Parliament, and shall be declared
only where the security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general
insurrection or disorder or at a time of national disaster, and
' 7 if declaration of a
state of emergency is necessary to restore peace and order.""
Although none of the above language directly relates to disease, South
Africa can still rely on the language of section 34 in declaring a state of
emergency. South Africa
can argue that their current HIV epidemic represents a
"national disaster."' " 8 HIV could easily be viewed as a national disaster since
one in five adults are believed to be infected;" 9 South Africa's national
economy continues to shrink by 1% each year due to a sick workforce; 20 life
21
expectancy in South Africa is expected to drop from 70 to 50 years by 2010;122
Africa.
and there are an estimated 1,600 new infections daily in South
Furthermore, it is estimated that between 140 and 150 thousand deaths occurred
in 2000 alone due to AIDS related complications. 123 This last statistic dwarfs by
114id.
115Id.
116

1d.

17 Patrick Marc, Compulsory Licensing and the South African Medicine Act of1997: Violation or
Compliance of the Trade RelatedAspects of Intellectual PropertyRights Agreement?, New York Law
School, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 122 (2001).
118Id.
119
Gumisai Mutume, supranote 1.
120Bombach, supra note 13, at 283.
121Id.

122
South Africa Scales Down Population Estimate with 300,000 due to AIDS, at
http://www.afrol.com/Categories/Health/health037 aids sa.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
123
HSRC Annual Report 2000/2001, Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health, at
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/about/annualReport/200 1/npa fs.html?npasocial.html-main (last visited
Apr. 15, 2004).
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comparison the deaths caused in Iran's 2003 earthquake in which 40,000 people
tragically died. 24 Since the HIV virus is a product of nature, and due to the
virus' effect on the economy, and the exorbitant toll on life, South Africa would
be within its rights under §34 of the South African Constitution to declare a state
of national emergency based upon this national disaster.
iii. Duration of a National Emergency
Since there is currently no cure for HIV/AIDS, the best medication can
only help the patient live with the disease by minimizing the problems related to
immune deficiency. Therefore, South Africa would have to declare a state of
national emergency for a minimum of decades so that their population can
continue to benefit from the lower prices brought by a license. A long term
solution is critical. If the flow of affordable or free medication were to stop, then
South Africa would greatly complicate their problem by creating a medicine
resistant strain of HIV.
TRIPs Article 3 1(g) states that a compulsory license shall terminate "if
and when the circumstances which lead to it cease to exist and are unlikely to
recur." 125 Keeping with this language, it can be argued that so long as South
Africa continues to suffer from over one hundred thousand AIDS related deaths
annually, a state of national emergency could continue to exist. Typically,
however, nations do not declare a state of national emergency for decades, and
as mentioned above, those infected with the HIV virus must continue to take
medication for their entire lives. Therefore, although South Africa can declare a
state of national emergency, this is only a temporary solution as they will lose
the compulsory license when they eventually return to a non-emergency state.
iv. National Emergency v. Good Faith Negotiations
South Africa must also examine whether a compulsory license which
was originally created under a state of national emergency can be transferred
into one based on good faith negotiations. In other words, can South Africa
declare a state of national emergency, get a compulsory license with minimal
delay, and then negotiate with the pharmaceutical manufacturers? The obvious
benefit of this approach is that South Africa could eliminate public pressure
from their people while lengthy negotiations are underway.
Critics of such a tactic will argue that it violates Article 31(b)'s
requirement of good faith negotiations. This, however, is not the case. Article
31(b) still requires a member nation to declare a state of national emergency
before a compulsory license can be granted without prior negotiations. It is
highly unlikely that countries will begin scaring their population and confusing
the rest of the world by declaring false states of emergency only to lower
124Reuters,

Natural Disaster Deaths Rose Sevenfold in 2003, at

http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory_16265.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
12, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3 1(g).
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transaction costs. Therefore, since nothing in TRIPs Article 31 prohibits good
faith negotiations after a license was granted based on a country declaring a
national emergency, South Africa should not fear long term problems from this
interim solution.
b.

Article 31(b): Public Non-Commercial Use

A third way South Africa may exploit Article 31(b) to their advantage
is to restrict the manufacturing of medicines to "public non-commercial use. 1 26
In order to invoke this provision, South Africa would have to create non-profit
government owned pharmaceutical manufacturing plants. The sole purpose of
the plants would be providing medication for their domestic population. Article
31(b) clearly states that such a use would be in compliance with the TRIPs
Agreement.
This provision probably represents South Africa's best option for
providing affordable medication for their public under the TRIPs Agreement
because it creates a long term solution. If South Africa were to create
government owned, hence public, non-commercial manufacturing facilities, it
could then grant compulsory licenses for HIV medication and distribute that
medication to the public at almost no cost to the user. While, this plan would
require the South African government to bear almost all of the cost of
manufacturing the medicines, this cost would be offset by the increased
productivity of a healthy workforce and the lower cost of producing the
medication due to the compulsory license granted under this provision.
It is important to note that the Doha Declaration held that the TRIPs
Agreement is intended to be read favoring pro-health policies of member
nations. For example, the Declaration states: "the TRIPs Agreement does not
and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public
health."'1 27 Furthermore, the Declaration continues: "the [TRIPs] Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
member's right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all."' 128 In light of this language, South Africa should not fear a
grievance brought before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body if they were to
invoke this section of Article 31(b) and begin manufacturing medication
domestically for non-commercial use.
c.

Other Options Under TRIPs
i.

Article 6: Parallel Importation

Article 6 of TRIPs also gives South Africa options for cheaper
medication. This article states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
126
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address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights" - namely parallel
imports. 129 Furthermore, the Doha Declaration confirmed that "each Member
Nation is free to establish its own regime of exhaustion of intellectual property
30
rights without there being a challenge in the WTO dispute settlement system."
Therefore, the TRIPs Agreement read in light of the Doha Declaration gives
South Africa the power to import medication from a parallel source, thereby
lowering drug prices and meeting the needs of their people.
This solution, however, is not without its problems. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers will quickly adapt the current pricing tiers to account for parallel
importation if it becomes too prevalent. In other words, the situation may arise
where a certain drug is cheapest in Country C, and in response, Countries A and
B (where due to pricing tiers, the medication is more expensive than in Country
C) refuse to buy directly from the manufacturer, buying instead entirely from
Country C.13 ' In the long run, this type of arrangement will only force the
pharmaceutical manufacturers to increase prices globally or restrict the volume
of medicine sent to any one country (perhaps based on need). Although parallel
importation is a quick fix, it creates problems when used as a permanent solution
and should only be used to supplement the supply of medicine, not create it.
ii. Article 8: Adopting Complaint Domestic Law
Finally, Article 8 of the TRIPs agreement grants Member Nations the
right to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health.' 32 Article 8 gives
all Member Nations the right to create domestic legislation to handle their
country specific intellectual property issues. South Africa relied on this Article
in adopting the SAMRSA and could do so again, if they opted to further amend
their SAMRSA so is it in compliance the TRIPs agreement.
Brazil is a great example of a country which used Article 8 to their
advantage. Prior to 1996, Brazilian law granted no patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. 133 Upon joining the WTO, however, Brazil had to change their
law to comply with TRIPs. Brazil reworked their domestic patent law to meet
the minimum requirements under TRIPs, but created a loophole for
pharmaceuticals under Article 8. Under modem Brazilian law, a drug is
patentable "only if the product has not been marketed anywhere and if no
serious and effective preparations for exploitation of the corresponding product
have been carried out by third parties in Brazil."'' 34 This provision has the effect
of denying patent protection to all HIV medication which was commercialized
anywhere in the world prior to May 14, 1997.135 Due to the intelligent drafting
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 6
129
130
Doha, supra note 113.
31Eppich, supranote 28, at 293. (For example, a 500 mg tablet of Cipro sells for $4.67 in the
United States, $1.29 in New Zeland, and $2.10 in South Africa.).
132
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of their intellectual property laws, Brazil was able to force prices of patented
also had the positive effect
drugs competing in their market down 79% 136 This
37
of reducing the death rate due to AIDS by 50%.1
VII.

CONCLUSION

No one can deny the crisis facing South Africa. South Africa's
population is too poor to afford the high prices of patented medication and this
situation is causing death at an alarming rate. Fortunately, there are solutions to
this problem. South Africa can create domestic law similar to that enacted by
Brazil under Article 8. This new law would, of course, have to be in compliance
with the minimum standards of the TRIPs agreement, but, the agreement leaves
member nations wide latitude to meet their individual needs.
South Africa could also create a compulsory license for the medication
under Article 31 of TRIPs. This license can be granted in one of three ways.
First, South Africa can negotiate with the pharmaceutical manufacturers
directly. Second, South Africa can declare a state of national emergency relying
on the "national disaster" provision of §34 of their Constitution. Third, South
Africa can invoke the "public non-commercial use" provision of Article 31(b)
and grant a compulsory license to government owned domestic pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Finally, South Africa can supplement their own supply of medication
through parallel imports under Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement. It is important
for South Africa, as well as the developed countries of the world to remember
that the TRIPs Agreement was created to provide a minimum standard of
protection for intellectual property. Furthermore, this Agreement, as clarified by
the Doha Declaration, is intended to "...be interpreted and implemented in a
public health and, in
manner supportive of WTO member's right to protect
138
particular, to promote access to medicines for all."
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THE STARR FOUNDATION
The Starr Foundation was established in 1955 by Cornelius Vander
Starr, an insurance entrepreneur who founded the American
International family of insurance and financial services companies,
now known as American International Group, Inc. (NYSE:AIG).
Mr. Starr, a pioneer of globalization, set up his first insurance
venture in Shanghai in 1919. He died in 1968 at the age of 76,
leaving his estate to the Foundation.
The Foundation currently has assets of approximately $3 billion,
making it one of the largest private foundations in the United
States. It makes grants in a number of areas, including education,
medicine and healthcare, public policy, human needs, culture and
the environment.
In addition to endowed C.V. Starr Scholarships, the Foundation
also supports financial aid programs and specialized internships at
numerous undergraduate and graduate institutions nationwide,
including schools of law, business, technology and liberal arts, as
well as the United Negro Scholarship Fund and a group of
historically black colleges and universities.

244

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol3/iss1/12

24

